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Setting Priorities: Budget and Program
Choices for Drug Control
Peter Reutert
The most visible political battle in drug policy in recent years
has been over the allocation of the federal drug control budget.
Discussions about what priority to assign to different ways of
reducing drug problems have begun and ended with how the
federal government spends its money on drug control. For the
last decade, the federal drug control budget has been heavily
weighted towards programs that are classified as "supply side."1
The first half of this Article argues that this debate has been
misguided. First, the federal drug budget is a poor approximation
of what the federal government spends to control the drug
problem; the debate is about numbers that are not meaningful.
Second, the federal drug budget, even if measured correctly, is
actually less than half total national drug control expenditures
when state and local drug spending are included; thus the debate
is focused on the wrong budget. We should be asking about the
composition of the national budget rather than the federal
budget. Third, budgets are driven by laws and programs; we
should debate those laws and programs and not the budgets that
result.
The Article's second half attempts to be constructive, inevita-
bly a more difficult task. Setting priorities requires clarity about
goals. Thus Part II begins by analyzing the current federal goal
of reducing the number of people who use drugs and how this
goal affects policy, in particular slighting treatment. Starting
from the premise that we seek a set of laws and programs that
t Professor of Public Affairs and of Criminology, University of Maryland. The re-
search reported here was supported by the Ford Foundation through its grant to the
RAND Drug Policy Research Center. Stacy Ainbinder provided helpful research assis-
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By "supply side," I mean enforcement, distribution, source-country, and production
controls. By "demand side," I mean prevention and treatment. In Fiscal Year 1993, the
federal drug control budget, as appropriated by Congress, allocated 65 percent to supply-
side programs and 35 percent to demand-side programs. Office of the National Drug Con-
trol Policy ("ONDCP"), 1994 National Drug Control Strategy Budget Summary 11 (1994)
("1994 NDCS Budget Summary").
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will minimize the total harms from drug use and drug control,
the Article asks how we should determine the role of punishment
while accepting the current prohibitions on drugs.
In answering this question, I first identify several elements
that make up "the drug problem" and then match the major
classes of drug control programs to those elements. Because each
class of drug control programs helps primarily with only certain
drug problem elements, the optimal mix of programs will vary
with the nature of the current drug problem, a crucial insight
given that the drug problem varies substantially over time and
among communities. It is likely that a more punitive approach is
more appropriate in the early stages of an epidemic than in later
stages. We are very much at the end of an epidemic of drug initi-
ation, so the arguments for a policy focusing primarily on people
who are already drug dependent is strong.
I. THE LIMITATION OF BUDGETS FOR DIRECTING POLICY
A. The Federal Drug Budget2
Since 1980, recorded federal expenditures on drug control'
have grown massively, from $1.5 billion in Fiscal Year 1981 to
$11.7 billion in Fiscal Year 1992.' Even after discounting for
inflation, there has been a five-fold growth in these expenditures.
Figure 1 presents the growth of the federal drug budget over this
period, expressed in constant 1987 dollars.
2 This section draws heavily on work by my former colleague Patrick Murphy. See
Patrick Murphy, Keeping Score: The Frailties of the Federal Drug Budget (RAND, 1994).
' The term "drug control" is defined in The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 1507(2),
Pub L No 100-690, 102 Stat 4181, 4188 (1988), codified at 21 USC § 1507(2). This statute,
which established the ONDCP, restricts its mandate to controlled substances. 21 USC §
1507(1). ONDCP budgets reflect this mandate and include only expenditures aimed at
reducing the supply of or demand for prohibited psychoactives, or mood-altering substanc-
es. Since 1992, the ONDCP has also included modest expenditures aimed at reducing
drinking by those under twenty-one. ONDCP, 1992 National Drug Control Strategy 10-11
(1992) ("1992 NDCS") (noting that expenditures for existing programs run by the Depart-
ment of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department
of Transportation to stem alcohol abuse by those under twenty-one will now be included
as drug abuse treatment expenditures). See also ONDCP, 1992 National Drug Control
Strategy Budget Summary 40 n 4 (1992) ("1992 NDCS Budget Summary").
' Id at 214. The figures here refer to annual appropriations, rather than to requests
by the Administration or to obligations. Fiscal Year 1981 represents the last budget of the
Carter Administration.
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Federal Drug Control Expenditures
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Throughout most of the period, at least two-thirds of the
money has been allocated to enforcement programs of various
types: source-country control (for example, eradication efforts and
military assistance to several Andean countries), interdiction (for
example, efforts to seize drugs and drug smugglers on their way
into the United States), and domestic enforcement (for example,
investigation of high-level dealers and incarceration of convicted
dealers and users).' As little as one-quarter and never more than
one-third of the total budget went to preventing drug use and
treating drug abuse or dependency.'
As the drug problem intensified during the late 1980s,7 some
senators pushed rhetorically for shifting resources to prevention
and treatment programs.' Congress, however, has been unable to
The categories used here are longstanding conventions in the discourse about drug
policy. I do not believe that they have been used consistently in recent years but cannot
offer an alternative breakdown of the budget, for reasons offered later in this part.
6 1992 NDCS Budget Summary at 3 (cited in note 3).
For example, deaths directly attributable to drug use increased 58 percent between
1980 and 1989. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System: A Na-
tional Report from the Bureau .of Justice Statistics 10 (1992).
8 See, for example, Senator Joseph R. Biden,"Introduction," in America's Drug Strat-
egy: Lessons of the Past... Steps Toward the Future v-xiii (United States Senate, 1993)
(report of the majority staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Interna-
145]
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accomplish this objective because the federal drug budget is a
misleading myth. That budget is not an appropriated budget,
decided on by the Administration or Congress, but is instead a
complex, after-the-fact calculation of what agencies claim to be
spending on drug control. The numbers in the federal drug bud-
get are highly questionable; it is likely that the federal govern-
ment is spending a good deal less than it claims, and it is possi-
ble that it spends roughly equal amounts on supply-side and
demand-side efforts. Moreover, the mechanisms for shifting funds
from one class of programs to the other are weak.
Of the $12.2 billion in the estimated federal drug budget for
1993, only about $2 billion was appropriated explicitly for drug
control.9 Congress could clearly decide to spend more or less on
these programs in light of its views on the drug problem and the
appropriate roles of the agencies. The remaining $10 billion was
hidden in agency budgets.
Agency drug budgets are weak approximations. Some
agencies simply assign a fixed proportion of their total budget to
drug control. For example, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS") assigns 15 percent of its budget to drug-control
activities;' ° the only way that Congress could cut the INS drug-
control budget by $10 million would be to cut the total agency
budget by $66 million. Because its appropriation is not directly
affected by its drug control figure, the INS has no incentive to
make an effort to get the figure right. Whether 15 percent is the
correct figure matters to no one.
These kinds of flat-line agency appropriations account for
about $3 billion of the "drug money" in agency budgets." The
remaining $8 billion is derived from algorithms (often smacking
tional Narcotics Control Caucus).
This is the sum of the few congressional appropriations that are explicitly and
exclusively for drug control: the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Forces, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, the Office of Na-
tional Drug Control Policy, and the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcot-
ics Matters. For Fiscal Year 1993 these totaled $1.81 billion. 1994 NDCS Budget Sum-
mary at 12-13 (1994) (cited in note 1).
10 1992 NDCS Budget Summary at 100 (cited in note 3); 1994 NDCS Budget Summa-
ry at 96 (cited in note 1) (showing figures from 1993 actual expenditures through 1995
requested expenditures). The detail offered in 1994 was that "[the drug percentage re-
flects estimated work years devoted to INS's drug mission. The three largest components
of the INS drug program are the Border Patrol, the Detention and Deportation and the
Investigations activities. INS counts 15 percent of Border Patrol, 25 percent of Detention
and Deportation, and 24 percent of Investigations resources as drug related." 1994 NDCS
Budget Summary at 96 n 2 (cited in note 1).
" Murphy, Keeping Score at 3 (cited in note 2).
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of alchemy) that rival Gramm-Rudman sequestration rules in
their complexity. For example, the Department of Veterans
Affairs ("VA") estimates how many of its patients are likely to
have primary drug problems, how many will have both drug and
alcohol problems, and how many will have drug problems and
other mental disorders; the VA then uses arbitrary (but possibly
reasonable) rules to estimate what percentage of its expenditures
on these clients will be classified as drug treatment."2 When it
decides on the VA budget, Congress does not know how it will af-
fect the VA drug budget. Indeed, the VA itself has only a rough
idea of what it will spend out of the forthcoming year's appropria-
tion on drug treatment. It is scarcely surprising that the Fiscal
Year 1991 figure for the VA in the drug budget, $368 million
when appropriated, had risen to $611 million when recalculated
in Fiscal Year 1993!"3 Nor is this a minor matter, as the VA ac-
counts for about one-third of estimated total federal treatment
expenditures in recent years.14
There are also serious problems in the categorization of pro-
grammatic expenditures: the labels "treatment" and "prevention"
are not explicitly defined for the budgetary exercise. The federal
government labels some funds as "drug prevention" that clearly
have additional purposes. For example, the Clinton Admin-
istration's 1995 drug budget lists $660 million in prevention
expenditures by the Department of Education (requested funds),
but in fact the proposed new Safe and Drug-Free Schools and
Community programs are clearly multipurpose programs, many
1 The ONDCP explanation of the VA drug budget estimate is as follows:
The drug percentage represents the drug treatment costs for all primary and
secondary drug diagnoses in all hospital bed sections, including costs of special-
ized drug dependence treatment units which account for approximately one-
third of total treatment costs. The drug portion of medical care costs is broken
down into four general components: 100 percent of the medical costs of patients
participating in drug treatment programs; 100 percent of the medical costs of
patients with a primary diagnosis of drug abuse but who are not participating in
drug treatment programs; 50 percent of the costs of patients with a secondary
diagnosis of drug abuse; 25 percent of the costs of patients with a secondary
diagnosis of substance abuse. Costs for drug treatment programs are counted at
100 percent. The percentage of costs attributable to the treatment of patients
with drug use disorders in other specialized treatment programs was calculated
to be 33.5 percent.
1992 NDCS Budget Summary at 194 (cited in note 3). See also Murphy, Keeping Score at
3 (cited in note 2).
Murphy, Keeping Score table 2 at 4 (cited in note 2).
In 1993, the federal government spent $2.339 billion dollars on treatment. 1994
NDCS Budget Summary at 11 (cited in note 1). The VA spent $899 million of that
amount. Id at 168.
145]
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of which are only loosely related to drug prevention: 5 "Funding
for this program is being included in the National Drug Control
Budget because activities supported with these funds will have
an impact on drug prevention as well as violence prevention."'
Even more questionable is the decision to include as prevention
funds the 1995 budget request from the "Crime Control Fund,"
which requested $284 million for additional police, primarily in
community-oriented policing roles. 7 It is perhaps not too cynical
to suggest that an administration that claims to be shifting prior-
ities away from enforcement, at a time of budget stringency," is
using creative accounting to accomplish that goal."9
Treatment funding totals are equally questionable. The
ONDCP reports that the Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA"), which administers Medicaid and Medicare, spent ap-
proximately $230 million in Fiscal Year 1993 on drug treat-
ment.2 ° This figure represents 0.1 percent of HCFA's total ex-
penditures of over $220 billion.2' Yet by increasing funding
enough to round up to the next tenth of a percent, a larger ap-
parent increase can show up on the books. Indeed, this illusion
appears in the 1995 figures, where an 11 percent real increase
appears to be a 100 percent increase when converted to percent-
ages.22 The benefit is twofold. The demand-reduction percentage
goes up, but such an "increase" does not involve spending new
money and thus has no effect on the deficit: Nor is any money
subtracted from another program account that is politically
salient.
Similarly, the Education Department's claim to be spending
$98 million in drug treatment represents at the *minimum an
expansive definition of treatment, as is its definition of vocational
rehabilitation as "those individuals whose disabling condition is
II 1994 NDCS Budget Summary at 27-31 (cited in note 1).
' Id at 29 (cited in note 1).
17 Id at 84. No explicit justification is offered for this surprising classification. Pre-
sumably the argument is that Community-Oriented Policing is more concerned with "pre-
venting" crime problems than with apprehending criminals; hence this kind of policing,
inasmuch as it bears on drugs, is "preventative." See Mark Harrison Moore, Community
Policing, in Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, eds, 15 Crime and Justice: A Review of
Research 113-14, 136-38 (University of Chicago Press, 1992).
'ONDCP, 1994 National Drug Control Strategy 1-9 (1994) ("1994 NDCS").
19 See, for example, id at 11 (claiming to raise the percentage of demand-side budget
from 35 percent to 41 percent).
20 Id at 41.
21 Id.
' 1994 NDCS at 41 (cited in note 18). The percentage rose to 0.2 percent in the 1995
request due to rounding from .145 percent to .155 percent.
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due to drug abuse."" By that rationale, all social service expen-
ditures on those who are harmed by their own drug abuse could
be categorized as drug treatment.
The numbers thus are deeply flawed, the result of institu-
tional biases, their detachment from any true budgeting process,
and the genuine complexity of measuring drug control efforts in
multifunction programs. Though the examples of bias presented
have been primarily from demand-side programs, I judge it likely
that the overstatement of expenditures (there is a bias against
underestimates) is even greater on the supply side than on the
demand side. Thus, the true drug budget for recent years may
turn out to be substantially smaller than Congress thinks, but
may have been split more evenly between demand- and supply-
side programs than the budget suggests.
Achieving programmatic balance in the federal budget is
made particularly complicated by the "imbedded" nature of so
much of the expenditures. It is essentially impossible to reallo-
cate what the Coast Guard spends on drug interdiction to treat-
ment or prevention. Moreover, given the complications introduced
by current budget restrictions, intended to produce discipline in
both Congress and the White House, it is hard to move money
between widely disparate agencies. If Congress wants to expand
treatment and prevention, then it will have to appropriate more
money for these types of programs, probably by appropriating
less for other health and education programs. That battle is not
one that treatment and prevention advocates relish, but the leg-
erdemain of such devices as calling community-policing expendi-
tures "prevention" is a poor substitute.
B. State and Local Budgets
The focus on the federal budget is particularly inappropriate
because so much money is spent by lower levels of government on
drug control out of their own tax revenues, as opposed to federal
grants. If budgets matter, then it is important to estimate these
non-federal expenditures and to develop ways to change their
composition.
The ONDCP recently commissioned the Census Bureau to
conduct a detailed study of state and local expenditures on drug
control. 4 That study reported estimates for Fiscal Years 1990
SId at 29.
2 ONDCP, State and Local Spending on Drug Control Activities (1993).
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and 199125 but provided little information about how the data
were collected. The Census Bureau estimate was incomplete: it
did not include expenditures by specialized units of government
such as independent school districts. 26 Still, the Census Bureau
concluded that state and local governments spent $14.1 billion on
drug control in 1990 and $15.9 billion in 1991.27 When one sub-
tracts the estimated $3.2 billion in federal transfer payments to
state and local governments in 1991,21 this produces a total of
$12.7 billion spent on drug control, compared to the $11 billion
spent by the federal government that year.
25 Id. The collection task is complicated because most drug control is carried out by
multifunction agencies with weak budgeting systems; there is no compelling way to ex-
tract the drug function. For example, police agencies do a lot of drug enforcement in the
course of routine patrol or detective work; consequently, data on the drug squad budget
will grossly underestimate the total going to drug control. The Census Bureau study does
not provide detail as to how respondent agencies were instructed to deal with such issues.
There are conceptual problems as well: to what extent is the arrest of drug-involved of-
fenders for non-drug offenses appropriately labeled drug control?
" Most local prevention expenditures are probably made by school districts. Preven-
tion expenditures are extremely difficult to estimate because schools do not split up their
budgets on the basis of curriculum content. One crude but appealing method is to esti-
mate what share of class time goes to drug prevention and then to allocate to prevention
the same share of the total budget for elementary and secondary education. That still
leaves two problems: estimating class time devoted to prevention and estimating the cost
of non-school prevention. My estimate is that no more than 1 percent of school time goes
to drug prevention, even broadly defined; that would suggest a 1991 expenditure total of
less than $2.5 billion of the total $250 billion spent by public elementary and secondary
schools. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994 151 at table
224 at 151 (1994).
27 ONDCP, State and Local Spending at 3 (cited in note 24).
2' Id at ii.
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Table 1
Estimated Government Drug Control Expenditures, 1991
(billions of dollars)
Govt Level/ Federal State Local
Program
Enforcement 7.20 5.65 5.97
Prevention 1.65 .40 .10
Treatment 2.07 2.02 .87
Total 10.92 8.07 6.94
Source: Peter Reuter
When all of these pieces are assembled,29 it is clear that the
total is even more heavily skewed toward enforcement than is
the federal allocation; the share going to treatment and preven-
tion at the state and local level is no more than one-quarter and
perhaps only one-fifth.
Focusing on the federal budget's overemphasis on enforce-
ment misses the primary budgetary target. If we as a nation are
too punitive, this result is the consequence of state and local
decisions; these levels of government are responsible for most of
the enforcement expenditures and most of the resulting imprison-
ments on drug offenses.0 Properly analyzing the federal budget
as a component of the national budget can lead to some strik-
ingly different conclusions. For example, expenditures on drug
interdiction have been frequently cited as too high a share of
federal drug control expenditures, given the evidence of
interdiction's limited effectiveness in either raising the price or
reducing the availability of cocaine and heroin."' However, given
9 The figures here are pieced together from the tables in the 1992 NDCS Budget
Summary and from State and Local Spending on Drug Control Activities. They include
some judgments about how federal payments to state and local governments are divided
among treatment, prevention, and enforcement. Federal prevention and treatment expen-
ditures include research expenditures in these activities.
' Data on correctional populations and drug enforcement expenditures, broken down
by level of government, are presented in Drugs, Crime and the Justice System at 148-51,
195 (cited in note 7).
' See Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave, Sealing the Borders: The
Effect of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction (RAND, 1988).
1451
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that only the federal government can carry out interdiction and
that the national enforcement budget is at least twice as large as
the federal budget, interdiction's recent share (less than 5 per-
cent of the consolidated total)32 may not be unreasonable.3
Moreover, the focus on federal budgets distracts attention from
where the most important decisions are being made, namely at
the state and local levels.
C. Programs, Not Budgets
The final element of my trilogy of errors is that because
budgets reflect policy, priorities should be discussed in terms of
policy rather than budgets. The primary determinant of federal
prison expenditures, to pick an easy example, is the law provid-
ing high mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders con-
victed of federal drug crimes. 4 If Congress wishes to spend less
on incarcerating drug offenders, it will have to cut those mini-
mum sentences and/or direct the Department of Justice to cut its
investigation or prosecution of drug offenders. Cutting the prison
budget will only mean that those who are sentenced will either
have to be let out earlier or that they will spend their sentences
in more crowded and ill-serviced facilities. Letting offenders out
earlier is difficult at the federal level because there is no longer a
federal parole board.35
A focus on budgets also tends to obscure important
differences among programs. The broadest labels, supply-side and
demand-side, are admittedly crude ones, but the slightly more re-
32 Interdiction in Fiscal Year 1994 was 10.7 percent of the federal budget. 1994
NDCS Budget Summary at 11 (cited in note 1). If state and local expenditures are greater
than those of the federal government, then the share will be below 5.35 percent.
' The process for justifying the interdiction expenditure involves some rough analytic
and empirical heuristics. The cost of smuggling is seen as primarily determined by inter-
diction-related activities; after all, the cost of sending a kilogram of cocaine by Federal Ex-
press from Colombia is less than $100. Smugglers in fact charge roughly $10,000 per kilo-
gram for their services, accounting for between 7 and 10 percent of the street price of a
kilogram. This estimate of smuggling costs is based on the margin between import and
export prices of cocaine. See David Anders Boyum, Reflections on Economic Theory and
Drug Enforcement table 6.7 at 272 (Ph.D. Diss, Harvard University, 1992) (on file with
the University of Chicago Legal Forum). If enforcement is seen as primarily working by
raising the price of drugs, one crude measure of a program's effectiveness is its contribu-
tion to that price.
' The minimum sentences for drug offenders have been raised in a series of acts
since 1984. See, for example, the Sentencing Reform Act, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987
(1984).
' The United States Parole Board was phased out in the 1984 Sentencing Reform
Act (cited in note 34).
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fined categorization (enforcement, treatment, and prevention) is
also basically flawed. William Bennett, in his eloquent "Introduc-
tion" to the first National Drug Control Strategy, objected to the
demand-side/supply-side split, arguing that enforcement could
directly reduce demand." After all, effective enforcement should
raise the price and reduce the availability of illicit drugs and
thus reduce consumption. Bennett equated consumption with
demand, a misconception that is common in the drug policy field
but that misses the central point of the distinction between
demand and supply. A decrease in consumption resulting from
higher prices rather than lower demand merely shifts the point
on the demand curve at which supply equals consumption, and is
likely to increase the revenues of drug sellers. Demand for drugs
is believed to be inelastic.37 Therefore, reduced consumption
without reduced demand, with its corresponding higher revenues
for drug sellers, will generally worsen various aspects of the drug
problem." A reduction in demand, on the other hand, will lower
consumption without generating these highly undesirable side
effects.
It is true that enforcement against drug retailers can reduce
demand. Mark Moore noted in 1973 that only enforcement that
raises the non-monetary costs of purchasing drugs, by making
them riskier or harder to find, shifts the demand curve;39 street-
level enforcement can, in theory, accomplish this. Because the
federal government attempts to confine itself to higher-level
enforcement, rather than street-level transactions, however, the
usual categorization of supply-and-demand programs is correct
for the federal budget (except perhaps for pass-throughs to local
governments for policing), but not for the "national" budget that
was discussed in the previous section.
ONDCP, 1989 National Drug Control Strategy 12-13 (1989) ("1989 NDCS").
7 No credible estimates of the elasticity of demand for illegal drugs, either singly or
as a group, have been published. An analogy is often drawn to cigarettes, for which stud-
ies have established that the elasticity of demand at current prices is substantially less
than one. See Edwin Mansfield, Applied Microeconomics 88 (W. W. Norton & Co., 6th ed
1994) (stating that many studies have found the price elasticity of demand is about 0.4).
Michael D. White and William A. Luksetich, Heroin: Price Elasticity and Enforcement
Strategies, 21 Economic Inquiry 557, 557-63 (1983) (arguing that dependency-creating
drugs have a price elasticity of demand of less than one).
' A higher price for a drug will in theory generate more violence in the trade because
it increases the incentive to steal or defraud and because court protections are not avail-
able for illegal contracts. As with most statements about the economics of the drug trade,
this is a reasonable speculation without any empirical testing.
" Mark H. Moore, Policies to Achieve Discrimination on the Effective Price of Heroin,
63 American Economic Review 270, 271-77 (1973).
145]
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Enforcement aimed at users, such as "sell-and-bust" in street
markets, 40 may be categorized as demand side, albeit not of the
kind that liberal advocates of treatment are likely to be happy
about. Yet enforcement aimed at users may indeed be effective in
preventing drug use; lack of easy access to highly visible markets
may do as much to deter those adolescents who are at moderate
risk of becoming regular drug users as any existing secondary
prevention program. However, it is difficult to distinguish user-
oriented enforcement from other kinds of local drug enforcement,
certainly in budgetary terms.
A discussion of priorities, then, must go to the content of
programs. Expanding efforts at enforced abstinence for pro-
bationers, parolees, and those out on pretrial release programs
will result in increased enforcement budgets but is substantially
a demand-side program.41 Its goal is to reduce the demand for
drugs, but it uses the threat of penalties, aimed at those users
whose behavior causes the greatest harm, to accomplish that
goal.
Moreover, there are more dimensions to policy than the
current budget splits suggest. Treatment for criminal justice
referrals has very different consequences for drug-related harms
than does treatment for pregnant women. The former provides
large gains to the community, through reductions in crime; the
latter's gains will primarily go to the infants of those women.
Comparing those gains is complex, but the latter is likely to
appear more congruent with the "public health" approach that
has become a popular slogan for drug policy reformers42 than is
treatment of high-rate criminal offenders. However, if one takes
a broad view of public health, in which violence is seen as a
major cause of health harms, then the former might be the pre-
ferred program.
Indeed, drug policy theoretically might best be divided not by
characteristics of program instruments (enforcement, treatment,
etc.) but by the nature of the harms reduced; unfortunately, that
is neither empirically nor politically feasible. But a realization
that different programs confer very different benefits, very differ-
o "Sell-and-bust" programs involve police officers masquerading as drug sellers. Oth-
er officers then arrest the customers. Mark A.R. Kleiman, Against Excess: Drug Policy for
Results 141 (Basic Books, 1992).
4 Id at 192-98.
2 See, for example, Lester Grinspoon and James B. Bakalar, The War on Drugs-A
Peace Proposal, 330 New England J of Medicine 357, 358 (1994).
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ently distributed across various beneficiary groups, helps point to
the weakness of the current classification.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY CHOICES
Although the federal budget is a poor indicator of current
drug policy, it is still too oriented toward law enforcement. This
bias stems from the goal of reducing drug use rather than reduc-
ing net harm. This Part thus begins by considering the objectives
of drug policy as embodied in the Bush Administration's annual
editions of the National Drug Control Strategy. This is followed
by an effort to develop an alternative set of goals that reflects the
harms with which drug policy should be concerned but that
accepts that most programs will only help alleviate certain harms
and may actually exacerbate others. Finally, I suggest some
guiding principles for both budget allocations and decisions about
punitiveness.
A. Goals for Drug Policy
In 1989, with the creation of the ONDCP, Congress imposed
on the Executive Branch of the federal government a require-
ment that it develop a strategy and explicit quantitative goals for
dealing with the drug problem.4 The 1988 Anti-Drug Omnibus
Control Act specified that the strategy, to be published annually,
should include "long-range goals for reducing drug abuse in the
United States"" and "short-term measurable objectives which
the Director determines may be realistically achieved in the two-
year period beginning on the date of the submission of the
strategy."4"
This marked an innovation for drug policy. Though other
administrations had issued drug-policy strategy documents,"
not one had defined its goals, either analytically or quantitative-
ly. Given the increasing governmental emphasis on quantitative
objectives,47 the 1988 requirement that explicit quantitative
" Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 1005, Pub L No 100-690, 102 Stat 4185, codified at
21 USC § 1504(a)(2)(A) (1988), 21 USC § 1504(a)(2)(B) (1988).
21 USC § 1504(a)(2)(A).
21 USC § 1504(a)(2)(B).
46 See, for example, Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force, White Paper on Drug
Abuse (1975); Domestic Council Drug Abuse Policy Office, Federal Strategy for Prevention
of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking (1982).
" See Michael A. Stoto, Ruth Behrens, and Connie Rosemont, eds, Healthy People
2000 1-2 (National Academy Press, 1991) ("prepared as a record of the public hearings
and other activities designed to gather and organize information for the United States
1451
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goals be developed can be seen as helping to move drug policy
from a principally moralistic domain toward the mainstream of
public policy.
The 1989 National Drug Control Strategy ("1989 NDCS")
clearly states the Administration's goals:
[T]he highest priority of our drug policy must be a stub-
born determination further to reduce the overall level of
drug use nationwide-experimental first use, 'casual'
use, regular use, and addiction alike.
48
This was reflected in its specific goals, which were heavily reliant
on the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse ("NHSDA"),4 s
and to a much lesser extent on the annual survey of high school
seniors conducted by the University of Michigan (Monitoring the
Future or "MTF") ° and the Drug Abuse Warning Network
("DAWN"). 1 As enunciated in the 1989 NDCS and reiterated by
its three Bush Administration successors, the goals were to re-
duce the following by specified percentages (almost always 10
percent in two years and 50 percent in ten years):
o NHSDA-measured last-month drug use;
o MTF-measured adolescent last-month drug use;
o NHSDA-measured last-year cocaine use;
o NHSDA-measured last-week cocaine use;
o NHSDA-measured last-month cocaine use among
those aged twelve to seventeen;
o NHSDA-measured last-month alcohol use among
adolescents;
Public Health Service in formulating national health objectives for the year 2000").
1989 NDCS at 8 (cited in note 36).
" The NHSDA is an annual general population survey. Its results are published by
the Department of Health and Human Services under the title National Household Sur-
vey on Drug Abuse: Main Findings.
' See Lloyd D. Johnston, Patrick M. O'Malley, and Jerald G. Bachman, National
Survey Results on Drug Use From Monitoring the Future Study, 1975-1992 (National In-
stitute on Drug Abuse ("NIDA"), 1993).
Published annually by the Department of Health and Human Services as Data
from the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN).
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o Drug Abuse Warning Network-Emergency Room
("DAWN-ER") mentions of cocaine, marijuana,
heroin and dangerous drugs;
o (a) Amounts of cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and dan-
gerous drugs entering the United States;
(b) NHSDA-measured availability of cocaine, mari-
juana, heroin, and dangerous drugs;
o Domestic marijuana production; and
o MTF-measured approval of drug use.5"
Two of the goals-amounts of cocaine, marijuana, heroin,
and dangerous drugs entering the United States (8a), and domes-
tic marijuana production (9)-have not been monitored simply
because no acceptable measures are available.53 That leaves
nine implemented goals, of which six use NHSDA data, two MTF
data, and one DAWN data.
The loss of the import and domestic marijuana production
measures is a major one. These would have served as surrogates
for total consumption of each drug. Because a small number of
frequent users account for the bulk of consumption, consumption
itself might serve as a surrogate for the number of frequent users
(and perhaps the average harms they produce).' That is, as
52 See 1989 NDCS at 93-97 (cited in note 36); ONDCP, 1990 National Drug Control
Strategy 117-121 (1990); ONDCP, 1991 National Drug Control Strategy 3-18 (1991); 1992
NDCS at 13-29 (cited in note 3). The Clinton Administration has issued one complete
National Drug Control Strategy, the 1994 NDCS (cited in note 18). This does contain a
more complete set of goals and may signal a strategy which is less punitive in orientation,
but the policy consequences of which cannot yet be assessed. 1994 NDCS at 61-72 (cited
in note 18).
"' 1992 NDCS at 25-27 (cited in note 3) (stating that current measures were not ade-
quate to determine progress toward these goals). The ability to develop estimates of im-
ports and domestic consumption is likely to be developed slowly at best. For a pessimistic
view on this topic, see Peter Reuter, Prevalence Estimation and Policy Formulation, 23 J
Drug Issues 167 (1993).
U For cocaine it is estimated that 22 percent of most frequent users account for 70
percent of total consumption. See Susan S. Everingham and C. Peter Rydell, Modeling the
Demand for Cocaine table 3.2 at 15; table 4.2 at 16 (RAND, 1994). For marijuana, some-
what dated figures are given in Peter Reuter, The Economic Significance of Illegal Mar-
kets in the United States: Some Observations (in French translation), in E. Archambault
and X. Greffe, eds, Les 6conomies non officielles (Le Decouverte, 1984). I have updated
these estimates of the concentration of marijuana use in unpublished tabulations from
Monitoring the Future. For heroin the concentration is much lower, since occasional use
has' become a rare phenomenon; a large percentage of those who use heroin in a given
year are heroin dependent. I know of no study that has attempted to analyze variation in
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compared to any available prevalence estimate, annual increases
in the total quantity consumed would provide a better indicator
of changes in the severity of drug harms because it is the drug
use of the most frequent users that drives this figure and the
related harms. As it is, we are left with measures of the numbers
of users, crudely categorized into frequency of use and/or age.
Before considering the consequences of these goals, note
what is missing from this list: deaths related to either the acute
or chronic effects of drug use; babies born damaged as the result
of maternal drug use during pregnancy; crimes caused by drug
use or distribution; disease (particularly AIDS) attributable to
drug use; and the illicit incomes generated by drug selling. These
are the harms that are mentioned most frequently in descriptions
of the nation's drug problems.55 Nor, as it turns out, are DAWN-
ER mentions a good surrogate for the adverse health conse-
quences of drug abuse. A substantial share of those showing up
at emergency rooms are seeking entry into detoxification rather
than reporting acute harms from drug use; 6 thus the availability
of detoxification and other treatment may be an important factor
in determining DAWN-ER totals.
As enunciated here, the principal goal of federal policy has
been the reduction of use and not of harms. But since there
would be no harms if there were no use, might the two not be
synonymous? The answer is that this is indeed a possibility, but
an unlikely one; use reduction and harm reduction57 are likely
to clash, at least in the medium term. For example, as already
mentioned, enforcement that reduces the number of users by
raising prices will probably increase drug expenditures and relat-
ed harms in the short run.
I suggest that one major reason for the absence of harms
from the "measurable goals" for the NDCS is simply that no
compelling measures exist. DAWN obtains data on the number of
annual heroin use among the heroin dependent.
' Lists of drug-related harms are hard to find, except in the studies of costs of drug
abuse. See Dorothy P. Rice, et al, The Economic Costs of Alcohol and Drug Abuse and
Mental Illness: 1985 (Department of Health and Human Services, 1990). The statement
reflects impressions from the policy and political literature.
For example, in 1991, 25 percent of those showing up at emergency rooms because
of cocaine were seeking detoxification. Department of Health and Human Services, Annu-
al Emergency Room Data 1991, Data From the Drug Abuse Warning Network 43 (1992) .
" The term "harm reduction" is commonly used in Western Europe but has had little
circulation in the United States. Inasmuch as it has been used in the United States, it has
been associated with legalization and thus has acquired a more controversial connotation
than is warranted. Use reduction is a transparent term coined by Robert MacCoun.
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medical examiner reports of deaths in which illicit drugs are one
of the causal factors. These data, however, only come from
medical examiners in about twenty-five major metropolitan
areas, and there is no systematic way to extrapolate these figures
to the nation as a whole.58 There are enormous conceptual as
well as practical difficulties in estimating the number of "drug-
related" crimes.59 No basis currently exists for estimating the
frequency or severity of harms suffered by drug-affected infants.
The first systematic estimate of incomes from drug selling was
only developed in 1991, and it has such a broad confidence
interval' that measuring trends will be exceptionally diffi-
cult."1
The congressional requirement for objective measurement is
another instance of the American faith in the power of measure-
ment, now taken to be a hallmark of good public policy. It is also
consistent with the American dedication to due process and
transparency in public policy. Requiring that goals be specified in
advance means that claims of success in a partisan setting can be
subject to reasonable scrutiny. If the measurements are seen as
deriving from systematic and credible sources, then the measure-
ments will facilitate such scrutiny. Alas, in situations where
measures are not available for the appropriate goals, the result is
"lamppost" measurement; like the drunk in the story, we are left
to look for the keys under the lamppost, a notoriously unre-
warding task.
One plausible approach for estimating the number of DAWN-defined deaths for a
single drug nationally would be to take the ratio of DAWN deaths to DAWN-ER mentions'
in cities where both medical examiner and emergency room data are collected and then to
apply that ratio to the national DAWN-ER estimate. However, Jonathan Caulkins, Assis-
tant Professor of Public Policy at Carnegie-Mellon University and Co-Director of the Drug
Policy Research Center at RAND, has examined the ratio of emergency room to medical
examiner mentions across cities and has found the figure to range from about 0.5 to 50,
without any strong central clustering. Personal communication with Jonathan Caulkins,
1993. We appear to be without any convincing means of estimating either the number, or
trends in numbers, of drug-related deaths. Vital-statistics-based estimates lack credibility;
when vital-statistics estimates are compared with those from DAWN, the latter are sub-
stantially higher.
" Goldstein, Brownstein, and Ryan attempted to estimate the number of drug-related
homicides in New York State in 1988 using detailed retrospective data. Almost 20 percent
of the cases could not be classified. Yet the data available on individual homicides is far
better than that for other crimes. Paul J. Goldstein, Henry H. Brownstein, and Patrick J.
Ryan, Drug-Related Homicide in New York: 1984 and 1988, 38 Crime & Delinquency 459,
471-72 (1992).
' A confidence interval is a statistical margin of error. Webster's Ninth New Colleg-
iate Dictionary 275 (Merriam-Webster Inc., 1986).
" ONDCP, What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs 1, 12-16 (1991).
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B. The Logical Consequences of Goals
The focus on punishment as the principal instrument for
drug control has many sources, such as American beliefs about
what constitutes the drug problem itself, as well as the real and
increasing association between drug abuse and crime. But the
federal government's choice of goals is also an important factor.
The evidence for this proposition lies in the rhetoric of actors and
the logic of the goals rather than in hard quantitative analysis;
the evidence is certainly capable of multiple interpretations.
Prevalence goals 2 are likely to reinforce the pre-existing
American emphasis on enforcement rather than treatment and
prevention. Treatment programs have little attraction as a means
for reducing prevalence because they operate on the tail of distri-
bution. Indeed, the 1992 NDCS, in commenting on the signifi-
cance of the goals established in 1989, stated that "[flor the first
time, the Federal government committed itself to measure pro-
gress by the actual reduction in drug use instead of the amount
of drugs seized, or the number of arrests made, or the number of
addicts treated.""3 Even if treatment programs were completely
effective, that is, if every patient entering the system in 1992
became drug-free thereafter, such programs would reduce the
total number of monthly users of illicit drugs by less than
700,000-less than 7 percent of the NHSDA monthly total.'
Taking a narrow scoring point of view, 5 the situation is
even worse. There is a considerable concern that the NHSDA
simply does not include many of those who are likely to be
treated. The survey omits incarcerated persons and the home-
less, many of whom have substantial drug problems. 7 It also
has a non-response rate of about 20 percent.8 Nor does the
2 Prevalence goals" refers to focus on numbers of users rather then harms.
1992 NDCS at 2 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
There were approximately 700,000 new treatment admissions in 1989. National
Drug and Alcoholism treatment United Survey: 1989 Main Findings Report table 4 at 12
(Department of Health and Human Services, 1990) 351,000 clients were reported to have
either drug problems or alcohol and drug problems. This is a one day count. I assume that
six months is approximately the average treatment time, resulting in approximately
700,000 for the year.
A "narrow scoring" point of view considers only how a program affects use as mea-
sured by surveys.
' Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, The Search for Rational Drug Control
203 (Cambridge University Press, 1992).
67 See, for example, Eric Wish, U.S. Drug Policy in the 1990s: Insights from New Data
on Arrestees, 25 Intl J of Addictions 377, 401 (1990).
' The 1991 response rate was 81.3 percent. Lana Harrison and Joseph Gfoerer, The
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NHSDA provide the basis for estimating the number of heroin
addicts. Indeed, heroin is not listed among the specific drugs for
which prevalence reduction is a stated goal;69 given the role that
heroin use plays in the spread of AIDS (through the sharing of
needles), this is a startling omission, explained (I suggest) by the
lack of credible measures of the size of the population. Since
1980, only one such national estimate has been published, and it
relies on highly speculative city-level estimates. ° Thus success-
ful treatment is unlikely to produce lower NHSDA prevalence
estimates.
The limitation of prevention is that a long lag occurs before
such efforts affect prevalence. Programs aimed at seventh
graders (aged thirteen to fourteen), the group most commonly
targeted by school-based prevention, will only substantially affect
prevalence measures five or six years later, as drug use rates
peak at ages eighteen to twenty-two.7 Though three of the goals
are specific to the younger age group (drug use and drug
approval measured in the MTF, and adolescent drug use in the
NHSDA), these have received secondary billing in the public
debates.
Use reduction is presented as a pragmatic rather than an
ideological or moral policy, though the immorality of drug use is
a fundamental tenet of its expression in the 1989 NDCS.72 Un-
der this view, the extraordinary drug problem that the United
States had during the late 1980s is the consequence of permissive
or tolerant attitudes, particularly in the 1960s. Large segments of
the youthful population came to believe that drugs were not
harmful. Governments did not take sufficient action to punish
those who broke the law by using drugs; enforcement was lax
and the media mocked those concerned with the dangers of
drugs. The best way, perhaps the only way, to diminish the drug
problem is for the government expressly, and aggressively, to
disapprove of all drug use. There are no goals that should be
sacrificed in the quest to minimize the number of persons using
drugs.73
Intersection of Drug Use and Criminal Behavior: Results from the National Household
Survey on Drug Abuse, 38 Crime and Delinquency 422, 425 (1992).
69 1989 NDCS at 193-97 (cited in note 36).
71 Cooley, et al, An Assessment of Methodologies for Generating Heroin Prevalence
Estimates (Research Triangle Institute, 1990).
7' NIDA, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Population Estimates 1990
(1991).
72 See, for example, 1989 NDCS at 2-3 (cited in note 36).
" Mark Kleiman correctly observes that use reduction could refer to either preva-
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A possible defense for focusing on use rather than harms is
that the level of harms is a simple function of the number of drug
users. Therefore, a reduction in prevalence will lead to a corre-
sponding, if not proportionate, reduction in harms. Not only does
that turn out to be highly implausible,7 4 but the focus on preva-
lence turns policy away from nuances of drug control that are
extremely important. It also leads to a dismissal of one of the
most important of all propositions about American drug policy,
namely that aggressive enforcement can actually increase drug-
related harms.
C. A More General Approach to Policy Consequences
1. Elements of the drug problem.
Table 2 presents a list of eight phenomena that I take to
constitute some of the major components of "the drug problem."
All of them have many elements themselves; for example, the
health consequences of drug dependence include an array of prob-
lems that affect users and the rest of the community, such as
HIV, tuberculosis, and hepatitis C. Crime by users includes both
"economic-compulsive crime" and crime induced by the psychoac-
tive properties of the drugs themselves, to use Paul Goldstein's
distinction.75 The list could be expanded, but I believe each item
of a larger list could be associated with one of the four categories
of sources used here: initiation, dependence, distribution, and
production.
lence (number of users) or quantity (amount of drugs consumed) and that these have very
different consequences. In the official statements, prevalence is the only measure used.
Personal communication with Mark Kleiman, Associate Professor, Kennedy School of
Government, Mar 1994.
¢' See notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
7 Paul Goldstein, The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework, 15
J of Drug Issues 493, 494-96 (1986).
SETTING PRIORITIES
Table 2
Elements of the Drug Problem
Elements Source
Adolescents dropping out of school Initiation
Gateway to other behavioral problems
High mortality and morbidity among Drug Dependence
users and their intimates
Crime by users
Large criminal incomes Drug Distribution
Violence in competition
Distortion of source country societies Drug Production
Strains on U.S. foreign policy
Some of the problems in the list are related not so much to
the consequences of drug use itself as to initiation of the young
into drug use. Young people's involvement in the subculture
surrounding illicit drugs, their routine violation of the law, and
their possible progression to drug dependence are the central
concerns associated with initiation. Another set of problems is
caused by the dependence or abuse of drugs; these include the
spread of AIDS and crimes committed to support expensive drug
use. Cocaine sells in illegal markets for about eight times its
legal price," which helps explain the high level of property crime
associated with dependence on cocaine.77 Sharing of dirty needles
in commercial shooting galleries by heroin addicts is largely a
function of the prohibition on unauthorized possession of hypo-
dermic needles."
' Cocaine is a Schedule II drug, occasionally used by dentists as a local anaesthetic.
On the ratio of legal to illegal prices, see Moore, 15 Crime and Justice: A Review of Re-
search 124 (cited in note 17).
7 Of those charged with crimes, urinalysis shows a high percentage testing positive
for recent use of cocaine. See Drug Use Forecasting: 1992 Annual Report (National Insti-
tute of Justice, 1992). Eric Wish shows that arrestees using cocaine account for a large
share of the number of estimated current cocaine users. Wish, 25 Intl J of Addictions at
398 (cited in note 67).
" The influence of legal availability of syringes on needle sharing is surprisingly
weak. For example, syringes are readily available at low prices from pharmacies in Italy
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Other problem elements, such as killings of rival drug
dealers, are not directly related to drug use but rather to the
distribution of drugs. Even if drugs did not adversely affect be-
havior, the struggle for markets and contract disputes in an ille-
gal setting would generate (at least in the United States) a great
deal of violence. Still other problem elements-for example, the
distorted social and political institutions in Bolivia, Colombia,
and Peru-are a function of the production of the drugs them-
selves.
If it were possible to eliminate illicit drug use altogether, all
of these problems would either vanish or would be much amelio-
rated. But because different elements of the problems have
different sources, lowering drug consumption does not necessarily
have the desired effect on all elements of the drug problem. Initi-
ation may decline sharply, as suggested above, even while depen-
dence is worsening. There are also policy trade-offs among these
components. For example, we may be able to reduce cocaine use
with more stringent enforcement against dealers, but we might
suffer, at least in the short run, a worsening of related crime and
health problems. Indeed, drug-related homicide appeared to rise
in 1990, just as there was mounting evidence of reduced drug
consumption.7"
Breaking up the drug problem into its component elements
helps clarify the programmatic consequences of the harm-reduc-
tion and use-reduction approaches8 0 The following subsection
identifies the relationship between particular programs and indi-
vidual elements of the problem and then examines how the
choice of goals affects program emphasis.
2. Matching programs and problems.
The traditional classification of programs dealing with drug
problems has been enforcement, treatment, and prevention. If we
further divide enforcement into the categories of source-country
control (for example, crop eradication and refinery destruction)
and Spain; nonetheless, needle sharing is common among intravenous drug users in those
countries, and so is HIV. See Jesus M. de Miguel and David L. Kirp, Spain: An Epidemic
of Denial, in David L. Kirp and Ronald Baylor, eds, AIDS in Industrialized Democracies:
Passions, Politics, and Policies 168, 179-80 (Rutgers University Press, 1992). Legal avail-
ability is perhaps less important than perceived availability in high-risk settings, such as
those around heroin-selling locations.
79 1990 NDCS at 117-18 (cited in note 52).
'0 Mark Kleiman makes a useful distinction by suggesting that drug policy can be
divided into laws and programs. See Kleiman, Against Excess at 280-85 (cited in note 40).
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and domestic enforcement (including interdiction of smuggled
drugs), we can match program types with the dimensions of the
drug problem schematized in Table 2. That matching is pre-
sented in Table 3.
Table 3
Matching Programs and Problem Elements
Program Targets
Prevention -+ Initiation
Treatment - Drug Use
Enforcement - Distribution
Source Country - Production Controls
Programs are usually evaluated in terms of the targets sug-
gested by this mapping. Thus primary-prevention programs are
evaluated mostly in terms of their effect on initiation into drug
use; successful prevention efforts will reduce the percentage of
nonusers or experimental users who become regular users. Re-
ductions in drug-related violence are neither expected nor mea-
sured. Similarly, treatment programs are evaluated in terms of
reducing the extent of drug dependence and associated harms.
Of course, programs may affect more than their principal
targets; the effects can even be negative. Increasingly, effective
treatment may actually worsen initiation problems by removing
the most visible and striking negative role models of addicted
drug users. That is not a reason for failing to provide funding for
drug treatment; it merely points to the difficulty of doing only
good.
Other negative interactions, mostly involving enforcement,
can be more serious. Consider, for example, the upstream effects
of interdiction. If more stringent interdiction works primarily by
raising the percentage of shipments intercepted, rather than by
raising the labor costs of smuggling through increased incarcera-
tion of smugglers, then it may actually increase the export de-
mand for the drug. That is because interdiction has two effects
on export demand. By raising prices in the United States, it de-
creases the total amount consumed. In addition, it also raises the
quantity of exports needed to deliver a ton to the United States.
145]
168 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1994:
This second effect, under reasonable assumptions about the de-
mand and supply curves of the cocaine industry, turns out to be
larger than the first."s Thus interdiction may actually increase
source-country problems by raising the demand for exports of
cocaine.
This matching of program types against goals provides a
framework for systematic comparative assessment of programs
and policies. We must ask of particular policies not simply how
they will affect levels of drug use, but also what their conse-
quences will be for other dimensions of the drug problem. For
example, evaluations of street crackdowns should determine their
effect on the crime rate and on recruitment rates. Similarly, in
allocating resources between prevention and treatment, we must
compare the benefits of reduced initiation now with those of
reduced heavy use now; the flow of benefits over time may be
very different for the two kinds of programs.
D. Programmatic Consequences of the Two Approaches
To illustrate the contrast between the use- and harm-
reduction approaches, consider two examples of policy issues: the
share of treatment in total funding and the emphasis given to
marijuana in enforcement.
1. Treatment.
It is clear that many, arguably the great majority, of the
harms associated with illegal drugs are the consequence of the
behavior of the relatively small number of persons who use ex-
pensive drugs frequently. They account for most of consumption;
for example, as already mentioned, 22 percent of cocaine users
account for 70 percent of the total weight consumed. 2 Thus one
may attribute to them roughly the same proportion of the vio-
lence and income generated by the drug trades. Heroin addicts,
totaling perhaps only 750,000, account for most of the drug-
related AIDS cases.83 No more than two million cocaine and
" Reuter, Crawford, and Cave, Sealing the Borders: The Effect of Increased Military
Participation in Drug Interdiction at 133-41 (cited in note 31).
82 See note 54.
On the number of heroin users, see Reuter, Prevalence Estimation and Policy For-
mulation at 167 (cited in note 53). On the large numbers of AIDS cases resulting from
drug use, see Report of the National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome, The Twin Epidemics of Substance Use and HIV 4 (1991).
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heroin users account for most of the property crime associated
with drugs.'
Treatment, even the rather low-quality treatment available
to most drug users lacking private insurance coverage, has a
measurable impact on the crime and health status of clients. 5
Reductions in drug use by patients while in treatment is substan-
tial, which seems to be sufficient to achieve these gains.8 Most
clients are not abstinent for long periods of time," but for harm-
reduction purposes,, the temporary gains are quite sufficient.
Rydell and Everingham find that treatment of frequent cocaine
users is cost-effective when compared to drug enforcement, even
if (1) every patient immediately relapses to heavy use after
leaving treatment, and (2) a fairly narrow definition of social cost
is used.8 Current treatment then may well be a cost-effective
intervention in terms of harm reduction.
In the use-reduction framework, the failure to achieve long-
term abstinence is a much more fundamental problem. Treat-
ment, as already suggested, will receive short shrift if policy
goals are expressed in terms of the number using drugs on even
an occasional basis in the course of a year. Moreover, program
performance will be assessed on abstinence rates per dollar;
treatments that, for a fixed sum, can achieve abstinence for a
small number of patients will be preferred over those that can
reduce (but not eliminate) drug use in a relatively large number
of patients.
2. Marijuana as an enforcement target.
Most of those who report using illicit drugs use only mari-
juana; in the 1991 MTF survey, such persons accounted for
nearly 50 percent of all young adults reporting use of some illicit
drug within the past year. 9 Even when looking at the popula-
' 1.1 million is a rough estimate of the total number of cocaine users arrested annu-
ally. Wish, 25 Intl J of Addictions at 401 (cited at note 69).
' The standard cite is to the TOPS study, which found that after only one year in
treatment there were significant reductions in future drug use and criminal activity; lon-
ger periods in treatment increase the likelihood of these positive effects. See Robert L.
Hubbard, et al, Drug Abuse Treatment: A National Study of Effectiveness 165, 179-84
(University of North Carolina Press, 1989).
' Id. The value of those gains is explored below.
87 For instance, roughly 13 percent of heavy cocaine users who complete a treatment
program do not return to heavy use after treatment. C. Peter Rydell and Susan S.
Everingham, Controlling Cocaine: Supply versus Demand Programs xv, 39-42 (RAND,
1994).
Id at xv, 39-42.
R9 For example, of those aged twenty-nine and thirty, 14 percent reported use of some
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tion in need of treatment, using the DSM-III-R criteria for depen-
dence utilized by the Institute of Medicine panel," McCaffrey
and Ebener estimate that almost half use no illicit drug other
than marijuana." If one seeks to reduce measured prevalence of
drug use, particularly among the young, marijuana is a very
attractive target. Moreover, marijuana is the only drug for which
tougher enforcement has been able to raise price on a consistent
basis; even after adjusting for the higher potency of contempo-
rary marijuana, the drug is at least five times as expensive as it
was a decade earlier.2 Ounce prices of $250 are not un-
common.
9 3
What are the harms associated with marijuana use? Put
aside for a moment its status as a gateway drug to others whose
use is known to cause substantial and lasting damage.9" It is
certainly not medically recommended, but Mark Kleiman, having
written a book on marijuana policy, summarized matters recently
by stating: "Aside from the almost self-evident proposition that
smoking anything is probably bad for the lungs, the quarter
century since large number of Americans began to use marijuana
has produced remarkably little laboratory or epidemiological
evidence of serious health damage done by the drug."95 The be-
havioral consequences cannot be dismissed so easily; there is no
doubt that many people use marijuana quite heavily, and that
such use can seriously disrupt an individual's education, personal
relationships, and career development.9" Though surprisingly
large numbers of persons are sometimes frequent marijuana
users (that is, they consume at least one joint each day for a
month), it is also clear that many pass through that state rela-
tively quickly. 7
illicit drug in the past year; only 5 percent reported use of any illicit drug other then mar-
ijuana. Lloyd D. Johnston, Patrick M. O'Malley, and Jerald G. Bachman, National Survey
Results on Drug Use from the Monitoring the Future Study, 1975-1992 Volume II, Young
Adults table 5A at 41-42 (Department of Health and Human Services, 1993).
'o Dean R. Gerstein and Henrick J. Harwood, eds, 1 Treating Drug Problems 70 (Na-
tional Academy Press, 1990). The DSM-III-R criteria are a list of characteristics drug
addicts often exhibit, such as "Important social, occupational, or recreational activities
given up because of substance use." Id table 3-2 at 71.
" Patricia Ebener, et al, Estimating the Need for Treatment from the Household Sur-
vey figure 11 at E21 (RAND, 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with the University of
Chicago Legal Forum).
Moore, Supply Reduction and Drug Law Enforcement at 125 (cited in note 76).
'ONDCP, Pulse Check: National Trends in Drug Abuse table 10 (1994).
Kleiman, Against Excess at 259-64 (cited in note 40).
Id at 253.
'6 Id at 258-59.
" The high school senior data consistently show that the ratio of one-time to current
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For harm-reduction purposes, marijuana would seem to be a
very low-priority drug, unless more marijuana usage results in
substantially higher rates of usage of drugs such as cocaine and
amphetamines. The existing research is not dispositive on this
point. It may well be true that the vast majority of cocaine users
were previously users of marijuana, but this does not mean that
the marginal user is at anything like the same risk as the aver-
age marijuana user of progressing to other drugs." If this is the
case, then marijuana enforcement might be greatly reduced over
current levels and those resources used for activities that will
reduce more harm.
The above are just illustrations of the many positive conse-
quences of shifting from a focus on use to a focus on the social
damage done by illicit drugs. Such a shift would clearly provide a
better basis for integrating alcohol with illicit drugs for policy
purposes. The goal of drug policy would be to minimize the harm
done by psychoactive drugs, regardless of their legal status; a
use-minimization policy forces a sharp distinction, since there is
no claim that society should attempt to minimize the number of
people who consume alcohol.
3. Goals and timing.
This discussion of the goals of drug policy has been quite
general so far; it has argued that prevalence goals may lead to
inappropriate programmatic choices. But there are also impor-
tant issues of timing that merit consideration.
During the period in which a substantial segment of the
youthful population was at risk of becoming very involved in
drug use (for example, in 1978 when 10.7 percent of high school
seniors reported daily use of marijuana in the previous thirty
days),9 a focus on prevalence had much greater justification
than it does today, when very low percentages of youth go beyond
brief experimentation.0 0 The problems associated with initia-
daily marijuana users is about three to one. Of those twelfth graders who reported having
used marijuana heavily at some point in their lives, only one-fourth had done so in the
last three months. Though these respondents are only seventeen or eighteen years old,
most who have been heavy users have already desisted from that state. Johnston, Patrick,
and O'Malley, Monitoring the Future table 33 at 254 (cited in note 89).
98 On the conceptual pathways from marijuana use to use of other drugs, see Robert
J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition 113 Psy-
chological Bulletin 497, 507 (1993).
Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman, Monitoring the Future at 78 (cited in note 89).
Id (reporting that only 1.9 percent of the class of 1992 reported daily use of mari-
juana).
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tion were much more important ten years ago. If enforcement
could have met its historic claim of reducing drug use by raising
prices and lowering availability, then toughness (along with pre-
vention) would stand on reasonable logical grounds. Use reduc-
tion and harm reduction would not be in great conflict.
Most projections for the next few years suggest declining
initiation and prevalence,'' along with a stable population of
problematic users generating more crime and disease, though
Monitoring the Future results for 1993 showed the first upturn in
marijuana use since 1979, pointing to the difficulty of projecting
changes in such culturally-determined behavior. °2 This sug-
gests that a change in emphasis is appropriate, as indeed is
signaled by the first Clinton Administration National Drug Con-
trol Strategy.03 The greatest harms of drug use are now those
related to drug dependence and distribution, for which drug
treatment offers a great deal more promise than either enforce-
ment or prevention. Long prison sentences for drug dealers, as
are now being handed out by the federal criminal justice
system, 10 4 seem to serve less and less purpose.
CONCLUSION
The federal budget has been the battlefront on which the
war about drug policy has primarily been waged. Even if budgets
were appropriate for the battle, the federal budget would be the
wrong battlefront, because of its questionable accuracy and in-
complete coverage. But budgets are blunt instruments, particu-
larly given that drug control functions are so deeply buried inside
the principal agencies. Priorities should be set in policy terms
and implemented in budgets; the battles should be about priori-
ties first.
No general assertion can be made about the priority to be
given punishment as opposed to treatment or prevention. The
optimal mix is not some eternal verity, true across all communi-
ties or time. Certainly much depends on how old the epidemic is
10 See An Assessment of the Incidence and Prevalence of Drug Abuse in the United
States: Report on the Technical Review Meeting (NIDA, 1991).
102 Lloyd Johnston, Patrick O'Malley, and Jerald Bachman, Press Release: Drug Use
Rises Among American Teen-agers 1 (University of Michigan News and Information Ser-
vice, 1994) (announcing results of the 1993 MFS).
103 1994 NDCS at iii-iv (cited in note 18) ("Message from the President").
1o4 The expected time served by drug offenders receiving federal prison sentences rose
from just under five years in 1985 to seven years in 1990. See Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1993 table 5.36 at 513 (1994).
SETTING PRIORITIES
and on the problems relating to drug use. Amphetamine use in
Stockholm in 1993, long after the drug had become an accepted
part of the drug scene there, presents a very different set of prob-
lems than cocaine use in Houston in 1983, with its attendant
violence and corruption.
Some general principles, however, can be discerned. More
attention should be paid to the relationship between punishment
and treatment. Punishment is likely to be more effective if it is
tied to treatment. More surprisingly, a growing literature sug-
gests that a significant part of the treatment-susceptible popula-
tion will do no worse when they are legally coerced into treat-
ment than they would if entering voluntarily. 15 Of course,
many will not enter treatment except when coerced. Punishment
and prevention have a less intimate relationship, but the dif-
ficulty of providing effective prevention in communities in which
the sale of drugs is conspicuous and ubiquitous is obvious. The
notion of "Weed and Seed," if not its execution, has a good deal of
logic.
This analysis has referred only to illicit drugs, violating the
revisionist view that the licit addictive and/or psychoactive sub-
stances, alcohol and tobacco, belong in the same policy domain.
Clearly important intersections exist, particularly with respect to
alcohol: at the programmatic level, few patients who are depen-
dent on illicit drugs do not also have alcohol-dependency prob-
lems. Integrating policies with respect to alcohol and illicit drugs
may help raise the priority for drug treatment as opposed to
enforcement; experience with alcohol-dependent relatives and
friends is common enough that there is an instinctive sympathy
for those with drinking problems, which contrasts with the mor-
alistic attitude toward drug dependency. Integration may also
ease the political path toward a harm-reduction approach. But
illicit drugs, with the distribution- and production-related vio-
lence and corruption, raise distinctive problems: an integrated
policy is not a uniform policy, and the optimal role of law enforce-
ment is likely to be greater for illicit drugs than for alcohol.
105 M. Douglas Anglin and Yih-Ing Hser, Treatment of Drug Abuse, in Michael Tonry
and James Q. Wilson, eds, 13 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 424-33 (University
of Chicago Press, 1990).
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